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Abstract
Return guarantee constitutes a key ingredient of classical life insur-
ance premium calculation. In the current low interest rate environment
insurers face increasingly strong financial incentives to reduce guaran-
teed returns embedded in life insurance contracts. However, return
guarantee lowering efforts are restrained by associated demand effects,
since a higher guaranteed return makes the net price of the insurance
cover lower. This tradeoff between possibly higher future insurance
obligations and the possibility of a larger demand for life insurance
products can theoretically also be considered when determining op-
timal guaranteed returns. In this paper, optimality of return guar-
antee levels is analyzed from a solvency point of view. Availability
and some other properties of optimal solutions for guaranteed returns
are explored and compared in a simple model for two measures of
solvency risk (company-level and contract-level VaR). The paper con-
cludes that a solvency risk minimizing optimal guaranteed return may
theoretically exist, although its practical availability can be impeded
by economic and regulatory constraints.
Keywords: Risk Analysis, Insurance
JEL: G11, G22
1 Introduction
Traditional life insurance premium calculation shares important features with
financial valuation methods: an essential part of the calculation is the quan-
tification of discounted (probability adjusted) cash flow values. Under the
∗Insurance Education and Research Group, Corvinus University of Budapest, Email:
borbala.szule@uni-corvinus.hu
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equivalence premium principle, that traditionally constitutes the basis for
net premium calculation in life insurance, the expected present value of paid
benefits equals the expected present value of net premium income for a cer-
tain type of insurance contract e. g. Banyár (2003) page 185, Dickson et al.
(2011) page 146). The interest rate applied to calculate these present values
(sometimes also referred to as technical rate of return) can be considered
as a guaranteed return. To safeguard solvency of insurance companies, the
maximum possible guaranteed returns are generally also fixed by regulation,
in Hungary this maximum rate was 2,9 % in July 2015 (61/2013. (XII. 17.)
NGM r.) which is lower than previously, for example as of 15th July 2000,
when the maximum rate was 5,5 % (CEIOPS (2005)).1
To some extent, guaranteed returns in life insurance are also related to
the market rate of return. This relationship have already been incorporated
into theoretical microeconomic models by assuming the application of an
actuarially fair interest rate (e. g. Yaari (1965)), or for example with the
application of market rate related interest in numerical calculations (Borch
(1980). It is worth mentioning that, in practice, guaranteed returns for a
life insurance policy are usually less than the market rate for risk-free assets
of the same maturity (Briys-de Varenne (1997)), and thus the guaranteed
return can be considered as a conservative estimate of future investment
earnings (Holsboer (2000)).
The incorporation of guaranteed returns into traditional life insurance
premium calculation can be financially risky for life insurance companies if
market interest rates decrease persistently. Previous studies confirmed that
the recent low interest rate environment has made it more challenging for
life insurance companies to manage their assets and liabilities (e.g. Berend
et al. (2013)), and that traditional life insurance return guarantees may have
substantial market value (e.g. Persson-Aase (1997)). Empirical studies also
point to a potential life insurance solvency risk in the prevailing period of
low interest rates (e.g. Kablau-Weiß (2014), EIOPA (2014)).
Recently, the solvency of insurance companies is a central issue in the
European Union, where the new Solvency II rules (regulation about insur-
ance company solvency) are expected to be introduced in 2016. There are
numerous measures for solvency risk, either related to the calculation of fail-
ure probabilities (e.g. Barnhill-Schumacher (2011)), or associated with an
other method, for example with the calculation of regulatory capital ratios
(e.g. Pierret (2015)). Literature also mentions the concept of Value-at-Risk
1In some other European Union countries there have also been developments in de-
termining the guaranteed interest rates applied in life insurance premium calculation: for
example (with effect from 1st January 2011) Denmark lowered this rate for new life insur-
ance contracts from 2 % to 1 %. (EIOPA (2011))
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(VaR) as having become a standard risk measure used to evaluate exposure to
risk in an institution. (Panjer (2001)) VaR can be interpreted as the amount
of capital required to ensure that a specific institution (for example insurance
company or bank) does not become technically insolvent (with an adequately
high degree of certainty). (McNeil (2005) pages 43-44, Panjer (2001)) CEA
– Mercer Oliver Wyman (2005) show that the majority of surveyed insur-
ance solvency assessment models applied the standard VaR approach, with
the Swiss Solvency Test applying Tail VaR2, being the only exception among
the surveyed models. VaR is also a key risk measure in the new Solvency II
regulation in the quantification of solvency capital requirements. (Directive
2009/138/EC, Article 101)
In this paper company-level (total) VaR and contract-level VaR are calcu-
lated to measure solvency capital requirement, which can be considered as a
measure of solvency risk.3 The key research question of the paper is, whether
theoretically a solvency risk minimizing guaranteed return can be found, if
potential demand effects of guaranteed return choices are also taken into ac-
count. A potential reason for a demand effect may be that (according to the
mathematics of equivalence principle based premium calculation method),
the net price of the life insurance cover (the net premium) is lower, if the
guaranteed return is higher. Thus, fierce competition in the insurance indus-
try may result in high guaranteed returns. (BIS (2011)) Empirical research
results also revealed that prince sensitivity of consumer demand for certain
types of life insurance may be non-negligible (e.g. Babbel (1985)).4 Demand
for life insurance may be measured with the number of insurance policies sold
by insurance companies. Since with a larger set of insurance contracts (with
the same main properties) the variance of profit may be lower, the demand
for an insurance product (measured as the number of sold insurance policies)
may also have an impact on the solvency of an insurance companies.
There are thus (at least in a simple theoretical model) two channels how
guaranteed returns in life insurance may affect solvency risk. After recog-
nizing these relationships, the question also arises whether theoretically an
optimal (solvency risk minimizing) guaranteed return exists. The paper ex-
2For continuous loss distribution functions TailVaR and Expected Shortfall refer to the
same value, and Expected Shortfall can be interpreted as the expected value of loss if the
loss is higher than VaR. (McNeil et al. (2005), pages 44-45.)
3Solvency risk could also be called „insolvency risk”, since both expressions can be
considered as referring to the same phenomenon (that the insurance company becomes
insolvent, which means that the insurance company can not remain solvent).
4Although it has to be emphasized that the existence of strong price elasticity of demand
for life insurance is not automatically equivalent to a high degree of price competition in
life insurance industry. (Babbel (1985))
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tends the literature on life insurance guaranteed returns by analyzing this
research questions in a simple model that also highlights possible demand
effects of guaranteed return choices. According to the results of the paper,
the existence of such an optimal guaranteed return is possible, although the
practical availability of the optimum can be restricted as a consequence of
economic and regulatory constraints.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical
model of the insurance company constructed to analyze the research question.
Section 3 provides a description of the solvency risk measures in the paper,
and Section 4 presents theoretical results about optimal guaranteed returns.
Section 5 concludes and describes directions for future research.
2 The model
The model aims at involving the most important features of insurance compa-
nies selling classical life insurance products.5 Among life insurance contract
types, a traditional distinction can be made between the conctracts whereby
the insurance company guarantees a specific return to the policyholder, and
the unit-linked contracts (without guaranteed return). (BIS (2011)) In the
paper only classical life insurance products with guaranteed returns are mod-
eled. The distinction between these types of contracts is relevant also from
the point of view of solvency: according to the new Solvency II rules capital
requirements may be lower for unit-linked insurance products, as in case of
many unit-linked products investment risk is borne by policyholders. (ECB
(2007), page 7)
According to Insurance Europe (2014) (page 23) the majority of assets on
the asset side of balance sheets of insurance companies is related to bonds,
and the largest component on the other side of the balance sheet is associated
with insurance liabilities. This balance sheet structure can be considered
as a consequence of "classical" insurance features: traditionally insurance
companies take insurance risks, receive premium payments and invest the
majority of collected premiums (mainly into bonds). A stylized balance sheet
for an insurance company is presented on Figure 1.
The insurance portfolio consists of individual contracts that are assumed
to be similar in the model: it is assumed that the probability belonging to the
occurrence of the insurance event (p) is the same for each insurance policy.
For each individual insurance policy the following random variable can be
defined:
5To some extent, non-life insurance differs from life insurance.
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Invested
assets
Equity
Insurance
liabilities
Figure 1: Stylized balance sheet
ξi =
{
1 if the insurance event occurs
0 otherwise
(1)
On company level, the sum of the random variables defined in Equation (1)
equals the total number of occured insurance event:
ξ = ξ1 + . . .+ ξn (2)
The random variable in Equation (2) is binomially distributed, and its distri-
bution function can be approximated with the normal distribution function
for a sufficiently large insurance portfolio.6
In practice, an insurance contract can be quite complex, this model how-
ever concentrates on the most important features of insurance contracts: it
is assumed that on the one hand the policyholder pays a single premium (net
premium plus certain expenses) and on the other hand policyholders are en-
titled to receive the sum insured (B) if the insurance event occurs during the
term of the insurance. It is assumed that the insurance is issued with a one
year term. The guaranteed return (technical rate of return) belonging to the
insurance contracts is indicated by i in the model. Based on these assump-
tions, and with the application of the equivalence principle7, the net premium
payable by the policyholder at the beginning of the insurance term equals
Bp
1+i
. At the beginning of the insurance term the sum of collected net pre-
miums equals the value of insurance reserves (that correspond to insurance
6It can be assumed in the model that the number of insurance contracts is higher
than the number that is required to a good approximation with the normal distribution
function.
7The equivalence principle is described by for example Banyár (2003) (on page 185)
and Dickson et al. (2011) (on page 146).
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liabilities). The number of insurance contracts depends on the guaranteed
return and is indicated by n(i) in the model. It is also assumed that (accord-
ing to usual microeconomic assumptions) if the insurance premium is lower
(as a consequence of a higher guaranteed return), then the demand for the
specific insurance type is higher, that can be formulated as ∂n(i)
∂i
> 0. The
paper does not aim to explore possible price competition issues within the
insurance industry, the presented analysis focuses on a single insurance com-
pany for which the size of the insurance portfolio (the number of insurance
contracts) depends on the value of guaranteed return.
Beside insurance liabilities, the insurance company is assumed to have
own funds (equity) as well, and without loss of generality it can be assumed
that equity is defined as sBp
1+i
with the application of a „solvency multiplier”
indicated by s.8
In the model, it is also assumed that at the beginning of the insurance
term the collected net premiums and the equity are invested into financial
assets that correspond to regulatory requirements for insurance company
investment. As indicated by Insurance Europe (2014) (page 23) a large part
of assets on the asset side of balance sheets of insurance companies is related
to bonds. The expected value of the return on these investments can be
assumed to be higher than the guaranteed return. In practice, excess return
sharing (over the guaranteed return) is often also regulated (the insurance
company receives only a part of the excess return). That part of the return
on the financial investments, that belongs to the insurance company (with
taking into account return sharing rules as well), is indicated by r in the
model. Since the presented analysis concentrates on the choice of guaranteed
returns, r is not assumed to be a random variable (although it can be assumed
that r is higher than i). The discounting rate is indicated by k. According to
Panjer (2001) the distribution of the present value of losses can be modeled
when solvency measures are calculated for lines of business of an insurance
company. The present value of loss in this model is described by Equation
(3):
η =
Bξ
1 + k
− n(i) Bp
1 + i
(1 + s)(1 + r)
1 + k
(3)
8In a simple form, this expression corresponds to solvency requirements that are influ-
enced by the total risk exposure of an insurance company.
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3 Solvency risk measures
Theoretically, there are several measures of solvency risk, and the definition
of a solvency risk measure may also depend on the context where risk is
measured. When analyzing banking sector data, Pierret (2005) for example
mentions regulatory capital ratios, certain market measures of risk (market
beta and realized volatility), and a measure of the expected capital shortfall
as solvency risk measures. In an insurance sector related analysis VaR can
also be considered as an adequate measure that quantifies solvency risk.
The growing importance of VaR in the insurance sector is related to the new
Solvency II regulation, where VaR is applied as a measure for solvency capital
requirements, with declaring that (Directive 2009/138/EC, Article 101):
"It shall correspond to the Value-at-Risk of the basic own funds
of an insurance or reinsurance undertaking subject to a confidence
level of 99,5% over a one-year period."
In the following company-level and contract-level VaR are considered as
alternative solvency measures in the paper.
VaR is an amount that may be interpreted as a random variable feature.
As a consequence of the random nature of insurance events the insurance
company is exposed to insurance risk: the number of contracts, whereon
the insurance company has to pay the sum insured, is a random variable.
Since the present value of loss in Equation (3) is a (linear) function of the
sum of insurance events in the model, it is also a random variable with
normal distribution. According to McNeil et al. (2005) (page 39) the mean
and standard deviation of a normally distributed variable, together with the
confidence level, is sufficient to calculate VaR. The mean present value of
loss is n(i) Bp
1+k
(1 − (1+s)(1+r)
1+i
) and the variance is
(
Bp
1+k
)2
n(i)p(1 − p). The
Value-at-Risk (VaR) belonging to the present value of loss (at α confidence
level) is calculated by Equation (4). In line with McNeil et al. (2005) (page
39), to emphasize the effect of guaranteed return on the result, in Equation
(4) it is also indicated that company level VaR depends on the value of the
guaranteed return in the model:
V aR(i) = n(i)
Bp
1 + k
(
1 − (1 + s)(1 + r)
1 + i
)
+
+ Φ−1(α)
B
1 + k
√
n(i)p(1 − p)
(4)
7
To ensure simplicity and unambigousity of notations, in the following ex-
pressions and graphs VaR indicates a company-level value, while it is clearly
signified when a result is related to contract-level VaR.
The influence of guaranteed return on life insurance demand is a key as-
sumption in the model, as explained more in detail in the previous section.
The importance of this assumption is illustrated by Figure 2, where a numer-
ical example demonstates the potentially large difference in VaR functions
with and without the assumption of a guaranteed return dependent life in-
surance demand. In the following, in the numerical examples it is assumed
that the number of insurance contracts (that can be considered as a measure
of life insurance demand) is described by Equation (5), where g > 0 and
c > 0:
n(i) = c(1 + i)g. (5)
This assumption about the size of the insurance portfolio can be interpreted
in a way that life insurance demand is not only explained by the guaranteed
return, but if the guaranteed return is higher, a larger demand for life insur-
ance may be observed. It also means that without assuming price sensitivity
of life insurance demand, the number of insurance contract is a constant
value (that does not depend on the value of guaranteed return). Figure 2
illustrates how significantly VaR may change if price sensitivity assumption
is introduced in the model (B = 1, i = 0.01, p = 0.05, s = 0.1, k = 0.1,
α = 0.995, r = 0.025, c = 10000, g = 50
3
).
Figure 2: Effect of price sensitivity on solvency risk
Source: own calculations
A possible alternative solvency measure in the model is contract-level VaR
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that can be defined as q(i) = V aR(i)
n(i)
. Equation (6) presents the definition of
contract-level VaR in the model:
q(i) =
Bp
1 + k
(
1 − (1 + s)(1 + r)
1 + i
)
+
+ Φ−1(α)
Bp
1 + k
√
p(1 − p) 1√
n(i)
(6)
Figure 2 shows that the sign of company-level VaR, and thus also that of
contract-level VaR, may be positive or negative as well. With recalling that
the loss variable has a normal distribution, a negative VaR in case of the loss
present value (that belongs to a relatively high confidence level) can be inter-
preted so that the theoretical mean of loss is also negative, that also indicates
that the theoretical mean of the profit is a positive value (and it can be con-
sidered as advantageous for an insurance company from an economic point of
view). If the VaR of loss is higher, it can be considered as less advantageous
for the insurance company in the model, since in this case solvency risk is
higher. In this model framework VaR is only interpreted as a measure of
solvency risk. Although (in an adequately designed model framework) VaR
values could also be interpreted as solvency capital requirement, it has to be
emphasized, that in this model the insurance company is assumed to have an
amount of capital that is enough to fulfil regulatory requirements (it means
that the value of the „solvency multiplier”, indicated by s in the model, is
assumed to be sufficiently high).
4 Optimal guaranteed returns
Changes in the value of guaranteed return can theoretically increase or de-
crease company-level or contract-level VaR. These effects on company-level
VaR are illustrated by Figure 3 for different insurance event occurrence prob-
abilities (B = 1, i = 0.01, s = 0.1, k = 0.1, α = 0.995, r = 0.015, c = 10000).
Figure 3 indicates that the extent of price sensitivity of demand has an
important effect on how guaranteed returns influence company level VaR:
if in Equation (5) g = 50
3
, then a higher guaranteed return results in a
higher company-level VaR, while for g = 100
3
in Equation (5) the opposite
relationship may be observed in the numerical example.
In spite of the relatively simply model framework, the effect of guaran-
teed return on VaR may be quite complex. The first order derivate of the
company-level VaR function in Equation (4) is presented by Equation (7).
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(a) with weaker price sensitivity,
g=50/3
(b) with stronger price sensitivity,
g=100/3
Figure 3: Effect of event probability on solvency risk
Source: own calculations
∂V aR(i)
∂i
=
Bp
1 + k
∂n(i)
∂i
(
1 − (1 + s)(1 + r)
1 + i
)
+
+
Bp
1 + k
∂n(i)
∂i
(
Φ−1(α)
√
n(i)p(1 − p)1
2
1√
n(i)
)
+
+ n(i)
(1 + s)(1 + r)
(1 + i)2
(7)
If it is assumed that both ∂n(i)
∂i
> 0 and ∂
2n(i)
∂i2
> 0 then it is possible that a
minimum in the company-level VaR function exists (since then it is possible
that for a certain guaranteed return value ∂V aR(i)
∂i
= 0 and ∂
2V aR(i)
∂i2
> 0. The
optimal guaranteed return value that minimizes company-level VaR (if such
an optimization is possible) can be calculated from solving Equation (8):
n(i)
(1 + i)2
(1 + s)(1 + r)(1 + k)
Bp
=
∂n(i)
∂i
(1 + s)(1 + r)
1 + i
− ∂n(i)
∂i
(
Φ−1(α)
√
n(i)p(1 − p)
2
√
n(i)
)
− ∂n(i)
∂i
(8)
Although a solvency risk minimizing guaranteed return may exist, it also
has to be emphasized that the existence of a company-level VaR minimiz-
ing guaranteed return depends also on the parameter values, and it is also
possible that such a minimum does not exist. An optimal result for a nu-
merical example (B = 1, i = 0.01, s = 0.1, k = 0.1, p = 0.0275, α = 0.995,
r = 0.0125, c = 10000, g = 110
3
) is illustrated on Figure 4:
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Figure 4: Effect of guaranteed return on VaR
Source: own calculations
Equation (8) may have more than one solutions, and it is also possible
that for one of the solutions the company-level VaR function has a (local)
maximum and for an other solution the company-level VaR is minimal. For
an economically correctly interpretable solution the optimal (VaR minimiz-
ing) guaranteed return should not be a negative number. In addition to
this, an other constraint should also be taken into consideration: in practice
a legally defined maximum value for guaranteed returns exist. By summa-
rizing the criteria for an optimal solution, one can conclude that a VaR
minimizing guaranteed return may be considered as „available”, if it is within
a relatively narrow interval, where the interval is defined by economic and
regulatory constraints. Figure 4 also illustrates that even if a company-level
VaR minimizing optimal guaranteed return exists, it may not be available if
the possible maximum guaranteed return defined by regulation is lower than
the mathematically optimum value.
Beside company-level VaR, contract-level VaR is also a possible solvency
risk measure. The first derivative of q(i) = V aR(i)
n(i)
describes how changes in
guaranteed return affect contract-level VaR:
∂q(i)
∂i
=
Bp(1 + s)(1 + r)
(1 + i)2(1 + k)
− ∂n(i)
∂i
Φ−1(α)B
√
p(1− p)
2(1 + k)
√
n(i)3
(9)
By setting the expression in Equation (9) equal to zero the condition that
defines optimal (contract-level VaR minimizing) guaranteed returns can be
calculated, as described by Equation (10).
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(a) p=0.0275 (b) p=0.0235
(c) p=0.035
Figure 5: Different optimum levels
Source: own calculations
(1 + i)2√
n(i)3
∂n(i)
∂i
= 2
√
p
1 − p
(1 + s)(1 + r)
Φ−1(α)
(10)
Similar to company-level VaR, it is also possible that Equation (10) does
not have an „available” solution. The second order derivative of q(i) = V aR(i)
n(i)
may be positive while Equation (10) holds, but it is also possible that a
contract-level VaR minimizing guaranteed return does not exist, or even if
it exists, it is not within the interval defined by economic and regulatory
constraints.
If a contract-level VaR minimizing optimal guaranteed return exists, it
may be higher or lower than the company-level VaR minimizing optimum
value. In a numerical example (for different insurance event probabilities)
Figure 5 shows three cases in which these optimum values differ (B = 1,
i = 0.01, s = 0.1, k = 0.1, α = 0.995, r = 0.05, c = 10000, g = 50
3
).
Figure 5 also illustrates that even if a solvency risk minimizing optimal
guaranteed return exists mathematically, it may be inavailable practically, if
the optimum value is higher than the regulatory maximum value.
For a number of reasons, it could be problematic to develop practical
business decisions based on these mathematical resuls. First of all, it is
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mathematically possible that there is no solvency risk minimizing optimum
that is not a negative value. Furthermore, the optimal solution should ideally
be lower than the legally defined maximum guaranteed return. In addition to
this, the choice of risk measures can also influence the results. Together with
these limitations, one of the main results of the paper is that theoretically,
in certain cases, a solvency risk minimizing guaranteed return can exist.
5 Conclusions
In the aftermath of the recent financial crises solvency risk measurement re-
ceived growing practical and academic attention. In the European insurance
industry the development of Solvency II, which also regulates solvency cap-
ital requirement for insurance companies expectedly from 2016 on, is also a
current issue. Solvency II regulation applies VaR as a measure for solvency
capital requirement, thus in this paper VaR based solvency risk measures are
applied to identify optimal guaranteed returns for life insurance.
Guaranteed returns in life insurance may influence solvency in several
ways, and in this paper premium calculation affecting and potential demand
influencing effects are analyzed. The key result of the paper is that (for both
solvency risk measures) a solvency risk minimizing optimal guaranteed return
may theoretically exist, its practical availability is however problematic due
to economic and regulatory constraints. Although a direct practical applica-
tion of the presented theoretical results is not possible during the preparation
of business decisions, theoretical results point out the complexity of the ef-
fects that guaranteed returns may have on solvency. With a refinement of
model assumptions it could be possible to achieve more practice oriented
results. Directions for future research include the development of model as-
sumptions about the link between guaranteed returns and market rates, and
a thorough modeling of policyholder surrender behaviour.
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